DIPAC

*Decreased Ideological Polarization and Conflict in Western Europe?*
**Linnaeus University, Mid Sweden University, University of Gothenburg.**
**Växjö 2022**

# DIPAC
# Election Manifesto Data
*TECHNICAL REPORT 2.0*

Sofie Blombäck, Jonas Hinnfors, Karl Loxbo,
Marie Demker, and Magnus Hagevi

## Contents

**About the project** ..... **3**

**Ideology in election manifestoes** ..... **4**

*Coding of ideology* ..... *4*

Table 1. Dimensions and sub-dimensions in election manifestos ..... 5

*Ideology- competence, main problem and main enemy* ..... *8*

Table 3. Variables for the mid-1970 ..... 9

Table 3. Variables for the mid-1970 (cont.) ..... 10

*The coding process* ..... *10*

*Missing manifestos* ..... *11*

*Reliability analysis* ..... *12*

Figure 1. Reliability test of Left-Right variables ..... 13

Figure 2. Reliability test of GAL-TAN variables ..... 13

*Validity check* ..... *14*

Figure 3. Correlations between the closest consecutive year of the same party on the economic Left-Right dimension and the GAL-TAN dimension, 1970s-2010s (Pearson's r) ..... 14

**References** ..... **15**

**Appendix I – Elections and parties** ..... **16**

**Appendix II – Coding schemes for Election manifestos** ..... **28**

**Appendix III – Variables** ..... **33**

# About the project

The data described in this report were collected for the DIPAC-project.[1] The project's aim was to investigate the proposed crisis of parties and party systems in Western Europe during the last four decades. The implications of the crisis are that the link between political parties and citizens has been broken, that the political substance of the dominant parties is becoming increasingly similar, and that party systems are being fragmented along new cleavages where right-wing populist, anti-immigration parties are being set against their opposites, such as green parties. The project aimed to answer the following two questions:

1. To what extent are the ideas and policies of political parties converging or diverging in Western European party systems?
2. Are changes in the parties' ideas and policies initiated mainly by the parties, or are they adjusting to voter demand arising from social changes?

One of our main goals was to collect and analyze data on parties, governments, parliaments, and voters in established democracies in a systematic and comparable manner for the time-period from the mid-1970s to the mid-2010s. The eight cases in focus in the project are Denmark, France, Germany[2], Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The selection of party systems means that the study focuses on established, historically persistent, economically well-developed, and wealthy representative democracies. However, the cases also include varying electoral and party systems in both federal and unitary states, as well as both consensus- and conflict-oriented party systems. Given these differences, our study represents a most-different-system design.[3]

The long time-period covered means that year-by-year data is not feasible. Instead, the aim has been to collect all types of data as close as possible to the middle of each decade, i.e. 1975, 1985, 1995, 2005 and 2015. Since election manifestos are not typically available for each year, we have focused on the election closest prior to the mid-point of each decade.

---

[1] Decreased Ideological Polarization and Conflict in Western Europe (DIPAC) is funded by the Swedish Research Council (grant id: 2014-01246) and the Crafoord Foundation (grant id: 20150635; 20160645). For more information see https://lnu.se/en/dipac

[2] Until German reunification we study the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany/the Bonn Republic). After reunification we study the entire country.

[3] Given that the focus is on European countries that have been stable democracies, there are a few other possible countries that we could have opted to stud, for example Austria, Finland, and Italy. These would not have added any substantial variation in terms of the political or party system criteria we have used. We thus prioritized covering a longer time period rather than adding more countries.

This report covers the data collected by coding electoral manifestos from all parties during our selected years.[4] While the main focus is on parties' ideological positions we have also coded if the parties emphasize competence over ideology and the parties' main enemy and problem.

# Ideology in election manifestoes

We regard ideology as visions, frames or worldviews that give voters an idea of how the party would like to see society develop and why. So, how do we establish whether parties stand for different ideologies or worldviews? While occasionally parties end up supporting the same concrete policy, they could do this for completely different reasons. A populist radical right party might propose reduced levels of immigration because the party is ideologically in favour of an 'ethnically homogeneous' society. At the same time, a social democratic party might be supporting similar levels of immigration because the party is eager to preserve its ideologically prioritised welfare state (Hinnfors et al. 2012: 599).

In order to tap into the parties' ideological reasoning, we believe it necessary to discern between levels of 'increasing specificity and orientation towards action' (Petersson 1964: 29). While pledges and issue positions are decidedly policy and action-oriented (Petersson 1964: 30; c.f. Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 8 ff.; Lewin 1967: 77; Rose 1993: 145 ff; for an overview, see Hinnfors 2006: 32 ff.) they do not provide us with first-hand information of a party's ideological vision, undiluted by strategic or other reasons. Our focus is the ideological frame that the policies and pledges are set in rather than the pledges and policies as such (Hinnfors 2006: 37; Åsard and Bennett 1997: 16). These ideological frames are 'ordering the world, ideas may shape agendas, which can profoundly shape outcomes. Insofar as ideas put blinders on people, reducing the number of conceivable alternatives, they serve as invisible switchmen, not only by turning action onto certain tracks rather than others … but also by obscuring the other tracks from the agent's view.' (Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 12). Potentially political actors position themselves 'along dimensions of ideology or values' which might 'shape voters' political choices' (Evans and De Graaf 2013: 5).

## Coding of ideology

In order to determine the parties' ideological positions, we have coded the election manifestos for each party during selected election years. The focus is on the manifesto as a whole, not sentences or sections. The coding is thus qualitative, with the coder making a judgment for each ideological sub-dimension. This also means

[4] See Appendix I for a list of all manifestos that are included.

that not every sentence is coded. Rather, the coder has identified typical quotes illustrating the party's reasoning on this dimension – along with any 'problematic' statements that might make the party's position unclear.

We code the parties' ideologies into two dimensions, each with several sub-dimensions.[5] These are listed in Table 1.

**Table 1. Dimensions and sub-dimensions in election manifestos**

| Left-Right | GAL-TAN |
|---|---|
| State-Market | Civil liberties – Law & order |
| Public-Private welfare provision | Cosmopolitanism - Nationalism |
| High – Low redistribution | Environment – Economic growth |
| | Individual liberty – Social authoritarianism |
| | Multiculturalism – National unity |
| | EU positive – EU negative |

The focus on coding is always on the ideological reasoning of the parties, in that there are no policy proposals that automatically place the party in a particular category on a particular dimension. Two parties can propose the same reform, but for different reasons. One party might advocate state run train companies because it believes the state should command as much of the economy as possible, while another party might be fiercely pro-market, but be willing to make an exception for publicly owned train companies due to managerial reasons. In the first case, the parties' belief in state ownership would lead it to be coded as Left on the sub-dimension State-Market. In the second case, the stated belief that the state should intervene in some cases, while the preference is for the free market would lead to a coding of Right with elements of Left.

The specific policy issues within each sub-dimension also tends to vary both between countries and over time. An example of this can be found in German manifestos from before the reunification, where the question of East Germany was sometimes discussed as foreign policy, with an emphasis on cosmopolitan co-operation (c.f. SDP, 1972) and sometimes as an issue of national unity (c.f. CDU/CSU, 1983). For this reason, we based the coding on a series of questions designed to tap into the ideological reasoning of the parties.[6]

*State-market* focuses on the state's role in economy. Should it regulate free market, and if so how much? Is it up to the state to solve (economic) problems, by

[5] The same sub-dimensions are used in our coding of government declarations (Blombäck et al 2022).

[6] The full coding scheme can be found in Appendix II.

regulation or stimulus packages, or is it better left to the market? Are government owned companies or utilities acceptable, or perhaps even desirable?

*Public-private welfare provision* focuses on who should provide welfare and other public goods. Does the party prefer private or public provision of, e.g., health care and education? Is it the responsibility of the state or the individual/family to pay?

*High – low redistribution* asks how much redistribution there should be between rich and poor, as well as on issues of social spending and taxation.

*Civil liberties - law and order* focuses on the tension between the individual's rights against intervention from the state and the states mandate to ensure collective safety. Does the party prioritize rule of law and civil liberties or security? Is crime best dealt with by prevention or a focus on law enforcement? How much government surveillance is acceptable?

*Cosmopolitanism – Nationalism* focuses on the country's relationship to the surrounding world. Does the party view contact and collaboration with other countries as beneficial or threatening? Is national sovereignty or international co-operation most important? Is national security and well-being best ensured by diplomacy and free trade or a strong military?

*Environment - economic growth* does not only ask if the party believes that protecting the environment is good, but also how the party prioritizes between the environment and the economy. Is environmental protection only possible or desirable as long as it does not damage the economy and the standard of living, or should we be willing to make financial sacrifices in order to safeguard nature?

*Individual liberty – social authoritarianism* focuses on the relationship between the individual and the societal collective. Does the party stress the individual's right to choose how to live their life or the importance of traditional values and social cohesion? Should the government's role be to protect minorities, promote traditional ways of live or simply to not interfere in issues of family formation, religion etc?

*Multiculturalism – national unity* deals with the relationship between the state/nation and minority groups. Should it be possible or even encouraged for individuals and groups to use different languages and have different beliefs, or are all such differences a threat to the national unity? Should minority groups be allowed to make some decisions for themselves, or is it more important that all citizens are treated exactly the same?

*EU positive – EU negative*, finally, asks what the party's views on European integration are. Should the country remain in/join the EU and push for further integration, or should it leave/not join the EU?

The first step is determining if the sub-dimension is present at all in the manifest, and coding how salient the sub-dimension is. Saliency is coded into *0-No mention*, *1-Mentioned*, *2-Somewhat discussed* and *3-Central dimension*. *No mention* simply means that the sub-dimension is not mentioned at all, while *Mentioned* means that the topic is addressed, but in such little detail that it is not possible to identify an ideological position.[7] *Central dimensions* indicates the three sub-dimensions most important for the party, which were identified either by the party making statements that a particular issue was most important or by several areas of politics being understood in the context of this sub-dimension.[8] It is, however, possible for a party to have a fewer than three central sub-dimensions, if these criteria are not met for three sub-dimensions. All other sub-dimensions, where it is possible to identify a position, are coded as *Somewhat discussed.*

The sub-dimensions can then be aggregated to the level of the Left-Right and GAL-TAN dimensions respectively. This gives an average saliency between 0 and 3.

Since the identifying characteristics of the sub-dimensions that are least salient is that we do not know what the government parties think of them, either because they are not mentioned at all or only in passing, we cannot code an ideological position for them. Thus, only those sub-dimensions that are discussed or central (saliency 2 or 3) are coded into ideological positions.

For each sub-dimension the position is coded from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating Left or GAL. Each sub-dimension has five possible steps. In addition to *Left* and *Right* it is possible to be *Left, with elements of Right*, and vice versa, or in the central *Both/Unclear* category. In addition to *GAL* and *TAN* it is possible to be *GAL, with elements of TAN*, and vice versa, or in the central *Both/Unclear* category.

We have aggregated the sub-dimensions to the level of the Left-Right and GAL-TAN dimensions respectively, divided them with the available number of subdimensions. This gives an ideological position between 0 (Left/GAL) and 1 (Right/TAN).

The central *Both/Unclear* category actually captures two theoretically distinct concepts, both those parties that are genuinely centrist and those parties that are unclear. In order to be able to distinguish between these we have added the concept of *blurriness* to or coding. For parties that have been in coded in the centre we indicate if this is because the party is actually ideologically centrist (not blurry) or if

[7] Examples include parties saying that the environment is important or stating that their country is a member of the EU, but not making any proposals or indicating what kind of development they would like to see.

[8] For example, by linking both economic and foreign policy to environmental issues, or by linking all social and economic problems with migration.

it is because the party is combining positions from either side of the ideological dimension (blurry).

## Ideology- competence, main problem and main enemy

We have coded each manifesto in terms of focus on an ideology or competence. If the party's appeal is mainly on its ideology or issue positions, we give it a score of 0, if it is mainly running on its governmental ability or previous success – competence – we give it a score of 1. Between the extremes and the middle score, we have with two intermediate levels (0,25 – ideology with some competence and 0,75 – competence with some ideology).

For each manifesto we also indicate the main problem and/or the main enemy.[9] For some parties this will be the same, since many parties indicate the government or opposition as the most important problem. For other parties the main problem might be more abstract, such as 'the economy'. Not all parties will always indicate a main enemy, making the presence or absence of an enemy an indicator of conflict between parties. Similarly, the main problem can be used as an alternative indication of which themes were salient in a manifesto or during a campaign.

The results from the coding are entered into a dataset. An example of how the variables is organized can be seen in Table 3. For the full set of variables, see Appendix III.

[9] We differentiate between government, opposition, other parties in parliament (e.g., far right parties) and non-parliamentary actors.

**Table 3. Variables for the mid-1970**

| Code | Variable |
|---|---|
| ID | 1-109 |
| Party_name | Party Name |
| Party_id | 28-142 |
| **General information** | |
| Countryname | Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom |
| Country_id | 1 Denmark, 2 France, 3 Germany, 4 Ireland, 5 Netherlands, 6 Norway, 7 Sweden, 8 United Kingdom |
| Year.1970 | Election year coded in the mid-1970s (year of election): 1972-1975 |
| End _term | 1976-1979 |
| **Ideological variables** | |
| SM_s.1970 | State-Market saliency in the mid-1970s |
| SM_p.1970 | State-Market position in the mid-1970s |
| SM_b.1970 | State-Market blurriness in the mid-1970s |
| PP_s.1970 | Public-Private welfare provision saliency in the mid-1970s |
| PP_p.1970 | Public-Private welfare provision position in the mid-1970s |
| PP_b.1970 | Public-Private welfare provision blurriness in the mid-1970s |
| RE_s.1970 | High-Low redistribution saliency in the mid-1970s |
| RE_p.1970 | High-Low redistribution position in the mid-1970s |
| RE_b.1970 | High-Low redistribution blurriness in the mid-1970s |
| LR_s.1970 | Average Left-Right saliency in the mid-1970s (SM_s.1970+PP_s.1970+RE_s.1970 /3) |
| LR_p.1970 | Average Left-Right position in the mid-1970s (SM_p.1970+PP_p.1970+RE_p.1970 /3) |
| LR_b.1970 | Average Left-Right blurriness in the mid-1970s (SM_b.1970+PP_b.1970+RE_b.1970 /3) |
| CL_s.1970 | Civil liberties –Law and order saliency in the mid-1970s |
| CL_p.1970 | Civil liberties –Law and order position in the mid-1970s |
| CL_b.1970 | Civil liberties –Law and order blurriness in the mid-1970s |
| CN_s.1970 | Cosmopolitanism – Nationalism saliency in the mid-1970s |
| CN_p.1970 | Cosmopolitanism – Nationalism position in the mid-1970s |
| CN_b.1970 | Cosmopolitanism – Nationalism blurriness in the mid-1970s |
| EE_s.1970 | Environment – Economic growth saliency in the mid-1970s |
| EE_p.1970 | Environment – Economic growth position in the mid-1970s |
| EE_b.1970 | Environment – Economic growth blurriness in the mid-1970s |

**Table 3. Variables for the mid-1970 (cont.)**

| | |
|---|---|
| IS_s.1970 | Individual liberty – Social authoritarianism saliency in the mid-1970s |
| IS_p.1970 | Individual liberty – Social authoritarianism position in the mid-1970s |
| IS_b.1970 | Individual liberty – Social authoritarianism blurriness in the mid-1970s |
| MN_s.1970 | Multiculturalism – National unity saliency in the mid-1970s |
| MN_p.1970 | Multiculturalism – National unity position in the mid-1970s |
| MN_b.1970 | Multiculturalism – National unity blurriness in the mid-1970s |
| EU_s.1970 | Pro-Anti EU saliency in the mid-1970s |
| EU_p.1970 | Pro-Anti EU position in the mid-1970s |
| EU_b.1970 | Pro-Anti EU blurriness in the mid-1970s |
| GT_s.1970 | Average GAL-TAN saliency in the mid-1970s (CL_s.1970+CN_s.1970+EE_s.1970+IS_s.1970+MN_s.1970+EU_s.1970/6) |
| GT_p.1970 | Average GAL-TAN position in the mid-1970s (CL_p.1970+CN_p.1970+EE_p.1970+IS_p.1970+MN_p.1970+EU_p.1970/6) |
| GT_b.1970 | Average GAL-TAN blurriness in the mid-1970s (CL_b.1970+CN_b.1970+EE_b.1970+IS_b.1970+MN_b.1970+EU_b.1970/6) |
| IC.1970 | Ideology – Competence in the mid-1970s: Mainly ideology (0), ideology with some competence (0.75), ideology and competence are mentioned with equal weight (0.5), competence with some ideology (0.25), competence (1) |
| Enemy.1970 | Main Enemy in the mid-1970s |
| Problem.1970 | Main Problem in the mid-1970s |

## The coding process

The coding was carried out by a small team of coders recruited among MA students and recent MA graduates at the department of political science at the University of Gothenburg, led by one of the project researchers.[10] All manifestos from the same party system were coded by the same coder, to ensure as much within country consistency as possible. At the same time, the coders worked close to each other,

[10] The four coders were Sofie Blombäck, Lena Caspers, Laura Lungu and Ruben Dielman. At the initial stages of the project Sara van der Meiden coded some manifestos while contributing to the development of the coding scheme. All these manifestos were recoded by a different coder one the coding scheme was finalized.

and were encouraged to discuss their coding so as to keep the whole project team 'on the same page'.

Each coder was given instructions in the coding manual and the NVivo software used and briefed on the aim of the coding – that is to achieve a qualitative overall assessment of the party's stance on each ideological sub-dimension. The coders read through each manifesto, flagging sections of text that were relevant for identifying an ideological position on one or more sub-dimension. The coder then summarized each manifesto into a coding sheet, indicating saliency, position and potential blurriness for each dimension, as well as the main enemy, main problem and focus on ideology or competence. For each of these coding decisions it was possible, but not mandatory, to enter a short comment motivating the coding decision. These coding sheets are aggregated into the dataset used in the DIPAC project, but all the coded manifestos are also preserved so that they can be referred back to when carrying out analyses.[11]

Coders were also instructed to make special note of any coding decisions that were difficult to make for any reason, and all these were discussed at regular meetings between the coders and the project researchers to ensure that all borderline cases were handled in the same way.

## Missing manifestos

Although the goal has been to include every party represented in parliament either before or after the election, sometimes this has not been possible, due to no manifestos being archived. This has been especially problematic for the earliest time periods we cover. The most common type of missing manifesto is for parties that had representation in the previous parliamentary period but lost it at the election we code: This can sometimes be a result of the party not running for re-election and sometimes a result of only manifestos from parties that gained representation being archived. However, especially in the UK and in France we are missing some large parties for the early time period.

In Appendix I all missing manifestos are indicated. We have chosen not to substitute other sources for the missing manifestos, meaning that we have no data for parties where no manifesto is available. This needs to be taken into account when analyzing the data.[12]

---

[11] For access to the full text of the manifestos with the DIPAC codes, contact the project manager (see https://lnu.se/en/dipac).

[12] Here we differ from for example the Comparative Manifesto Project (see e.g. Gemenis, 2013), since we want to keep the focus on the ideological messages in election manifestos in particular, in order to make sure that we compare the same type of source for each party.

## Reliability analysis

While it should be kept in mind that a qualitative coding such as the one undertaken here can never be as precise as a more quantitative content analysis, we have carried out reliability coding for a part of the data. A new coder coded approximately 15 percent of the material. Krippendorf's Alpha (De Swert, 2012), was calculated for the saliency and position for each of the sub-dimensions. Krippendorf's Alpha (KALPHA) not only considers the observed, but also the expected, disagreement between two coders. The observed disagreement indicates the percentage of mismatches between coders in values attributed to the same units, whereas the expected disagreement is a probability measure that coders code a unit rightly just by chance. KALHPA is basically a measure of correlation, ranging from 0 to 1, between two variables (the same variable coded twice) weighed by the probability that correct coding is random. A score of 0.8 or above is usually seen as an indication of good inter coder reliability, but scores as low as 0.6 can be acceptable if the coding is highly complex, as is the case here.

The result of the reliability coding is shown in Figures 1 through 3, indicating the scores both for treating the scale as ordinal and nominal values. Most indicators reach or surpass the 0.6 threshold, especially when it comes to the coding of the left-right variables. While the GAL-TAN variables show some more variation, it is worth noting that the aggregated ideological dimension has mean scores of just below 0.8, indicating that at the aggregated level we have high inter coder reliability.

The ideology-competence variable was also recoded. It is not shown in the figures, but the KALPHA score was 0.84, regardless of whether the scale was considered to be nominal or ordinal.

**Figure 1. Reliability test of Left-Right variables**




**Figure 2. Reliability test of GAL-TAN variables**



## Validity check

As a further check on the quality of our coding, we have checked the internal correlation for each dimension over time. These are shown in Figure 3. We find that there is a significant correlation between parties' positions over time, for both dimensions. For the GAL-TAN dimension, the correlation increases over time. The consistently high correlation for the Left-Right dimension indicates that the coding captures similar ideological content at different points in time, despite any changes in issue focus, manifest length and so on in the long time period covered by the data. The sharp increase in correlations for the GAL-TAN dimension for the first time period is consistent with what we would expect for a newer dimension that is gradually stabilizing and becoming more prominent over the time period covered. This also goes hand in hand with the increased saliency we find for the dimension.

**Figure 3. Correlations between the closest consecutive years of the same party on the economic Left-Right dimension and the GAL-TAN dimension, 1970s-2010s (Pearson's r)**



# References


Åsard, E., and W. L. Bennett (1997). *Democracy and the Marketplace of Ideas*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Blombäck, S., M. Demker, K. Loxbo, M. Hagevi, and J. Hinnfors (2022). *DIPAC Governemnt Declaration Data: Techinical Report 2.0*. Växjö: Linnaeus University, (December 30, 2022: https://lnu.se/en/dipac).

CDU/CSU (1983) *Arbeit, Frieden, Zukunft Miteinander schaffen wir's : Das Wahlprogramm der CDU/CSU*. CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle: Bonn

De Swert, K. (2012). Calculating inter-coder reliability in media content analysis using Krippendorff's Alpha. *Center for Politics and Communication*, 1-15.

Döring, H. & P. Manow. (2019). Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov): Information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies.

Evans, G., and N. D. De Graaf, eds. (2013). *Political choice matters: explaining the strength of class and religious cleavages in cross-national perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gemenis, K.(2013). 'What to Do (and Not to Do) with the Comparative Manifestos Project Data', *Political Studies,* 61:S1*,* 3–23.

Goldstein, J., and R. O. Keohane, eds. (1993). *Ideas and foreign policy: beliefs, institutions, and political change*. Cornell University Press.

Hinnfors, J. (2006). *Reinterpreting social democracy: a history of stability in the British Labour Party and Swedish Social Democratic Party*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Hinnfors, J., A. Spehar, and G. Bucken-Knapp (2012). 'The missing factor: Why social democracy can lead to restrictive immigration policy', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 19:4, 585-603.

Lewin, L. (1967) *Planhushållningsdebatten.* Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell.

Petersson, H. F. (1964). *Power and International Order*. Lund: C W K Gleerup.

Rose, R. (1993). *Lesson-Drawing in Public Policy. A Guide to Learning Across Time and Space*. Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, Inc.

SDP (1972) *Wahlprogramm der SPD : mit Willy Brandt für Frieden, Sicherheit und eine bessere Qualität des Lebens.* Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands: Bonn

# Appendix I – Elections and parties

| Country | Year | Parties | Election result |
|---|---|---|---|
| Denmark | 1975 | Socialdemokraterne | 29.9 |
| | | Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti | 23.3 |
| | | Fremskridtspartiet | 13.6 |
| | | Det Radikale Venstre | 7.1 |
| | | Det Konservative Folkeparti | 5.5 |
| | | Kristeligt Folkeparti | 5.3 |
| | | Socialistisk Folkeparti | 5.0 |
| | | Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti | 4.2 |
| | | Venstresocialisterne | 2.1 |
| | | Retsforbundet | 1.8 |
| | 1984 | Centrumdemokraterne | 2.2 |
| | | Slesvigsk Parti* | Alliance |
| | | Danmarks Retsforbund | Previous |
| | | Socialdemokraterne | 31.6 |
| | | Det Konservative Folkeparti | 23.4 |
| | | Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti | 12.1 |
| | | Socialistisk Folkeparti | 11.5 |
| | | Det Radikale Venstre | 5.5 |
| | | Centrumdemokraterne | 4.6 |
| | | Fremskridtspartiet | 3.6 |
| | | Kristeligt Folkeparti | 2.7 |
| | | Venstresocialisterne | 2.7 |
| | 1994 | Socialdemokraterne | 34.6 |
| | | Det Konservative Folkeparti | 15.0 |
| | | Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti | 23.3 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Socialistisk Folkeparti | 7.3 |
| | | Det Radikale Venstre | 4.6 |
| | | Centrumdemokraterne | 2.8 |
| | | Fremskridtspartiet | 6.4 |
| | | Enhedslisten – De Rød-Grønne | 3.1 |
| | | Kristeligt Folkeparti | 1.8 |
| | 2005 | Socialdemokraterne | 25.8 |
| | | Det Konservative Folkeparti | 10.3 |
| | | Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti | 29.0 |
| | | Socialistisk Folkeparti | 6.0 |
| | | Det Radikale Venstre | 9.2 |
| | | Enhedslisten – De Rød-Grønne | 3.4 |
| | | Dansk Folkeparti | 13.3 |
| | 2015 | Socialdemokraterne | 25.7 |
| | | Det Konservative Folkeparti | 3.3 |
| | | Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti | 19.0 |
| | | Socialistisk Folkeparti* | 4.1 |
| | | Det Radikale Venstre | 4.5 |
| | | Enhedslisten – De Rød-Grønne | 7.6 |
| | | Dansk Folkeparti | 20.6 |
| | | Liberal Alliance | 7.4 |
| | | Alternativet | 4.7 |
| France | 1973 | Rassemblement pour la Republique (Gaulliste) | 26.0 |
| | | Fédération nationale des républicains et indépendants* | 7.2 (Alliance) |
| | | Mouvement réformateur* | 13.3 |
| | | Centre démocratie et progrés* | 3.8 (Alliance) |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | Centre National des Indépendants et Paysans* | 3.4 |
| | Parti Socialiste | 19.1 |
| | Parti Communiste Française | 21.4 |
| | Parti Radical de Gauche* | 1.7 |
| | Parti Socialiste Unifie* | 2.0 |
| 1981 | Rassemblement pour la Republique (Gaulliste) | 20.7 |
| | Centre National des Indépendants et Paysans* | 2.6 |
| | Parti Socialiste | 36.0 |
| | Parti Communiste Française | 16.1 |
| | Parti Radical de Gauche* | 1.1 |
| | Union pour la Démocratie Française | 2.2 |
| 1993 | Rassemblement pour la Republique (Gaulliste) | 20.4 |
| | Parti Socialiste | 17.6 |
| | Parti Communiste Française | 9.2 |
| | Parti Radical de Gauche* | 0.9 |
| | Union pour la Démocratie Française | 19.1 |
| | Various right-wing candidates* | 4.7 |
| | Front National | 12.4 (Previous) |
| 2002 | Union pour un Mouvement Populaire | 33.3 |
| | Parti Socialiste* | 24.1 |
| | Parti Communiste Française | 4.8 |
| | Parti Radical de Gauche* | 1.5 |
| | Union pour la Démocratie Française | 4.9 |
| | Front National | 11.3 (Previous) |
| | Rassemblement pour la France | 0.4 |
| | Mouvement pour la France* | 0.8 |
| | Démocratie libérale | 0.4 (Alliance) |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Les Verts | 4.5 |
| | | Various left-wing candidates* | 1.1 |
| | | Various right-wing candidates* | 3.7 |
| | | Mouvement des Citoyens* | 1.2 (Previous) |
| | 2012 | Union pour un Mouvement Populaire | 27.1 |
| | | Parti Socialiste | 29.4 |
| | | Parti Communiste Française | 6.9 |
| | | Parti Radical de Gauche | 1.7 |
| | | Front National | 13.6 |
| | | Mouvement pour la France* | Previous |
| | | Les Verts | 5.5 |
| | | Nouveau Centre | 2.2 |
| | | Mouvement Démocrate | 1.8 |
| | | Mouvement independantiste martiniquais* | 0.6 |
| | | Parti Radical | 1.2 |
| | | Alliance Centriste | 0.6 |
| | | Extrême droite* | 0.2 |
| | | Various left-wing candidates* | 3.4 |
| | | Various right-wing candidates* | 3.5 |
| Germany | 1972 | Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands | 45.8 |
| | | Christlich Demokratische Union | 35.2 (Alliance) |
| | | Christlich Soziale Union | 9.7 (Alliance) |
| | | Freie Demokratische Partei | 8.4 |
| | 1983 | Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands | 38.2 |
| | | Christlich Demokratische Union | 38.2 (Alliance) |
| | | Christlich Soziale Union | 10.6 (Alliance) |
| | | Freie Demokratische Partei | 7.0 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Die Grünen | 5.6 |
| | 1994 | Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands | 36.4 |
| | | Christlich Demokratische Union | 34.2 (Alliance) |
| | | Christlich Soziale Union | 7.3 (Alliance) |
| | | Freie Demokratische Partei | 6.9 |
| | | Bündnis 90/Die Grünen | 7.3 |
| | | Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus | 4.4 |
| | 2005 | Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands | 34.2 |
| | | Christlich Demokratische Union | 27.8 (Alliance) |
| | | Christlich Soziale Union | 7.4 (Alliance) |
| | | Freie Demokratische Partei | 9.8 |
| | | Bündnis 90/Die Grünen | 8.1 |
| | | Die Linke / PDS | 8.7 |
| | 2013 | Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands | 25.7 |
| | | Christlich Demokratische Union | 34.1 (Alliance) |
| | | Christlich Soziale Union | 7.4 (Alliance) |
| | | Freie Demokratische Partei | 4.8 (Previous) |
| | | Bündnis 90/Die Grünen | 8.4 |
| | | Die Linke / PDS | 8.6 |
| Ireland | 1973 | Fianna Fáil | 46.2 |
| | | Fine Gael | 35.1 |
| | | Labour Party | 13.7 |
| | 1982 | Fianna Fáil | 45.2 |
| | | Fine Gael | 39.2 |
| | | Labour Party | 9.4 |
| | | The Workers' Party | 3.3 |
| | 1992 | Fianna Fáil | 39.1 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Fine Gael | 24.5 |
| | | Labour Party | 19.3 |
| | | Progressive Democrats | 4.7 |
| | | Democratic Left | 2.8 |
| | | Green Party | 1.4 |
| | 2002 | Fianna Fáil | 41.5 |
| | | Fine Gael | 22.5 |
| | | Labour Party | 10.8 |
| | | Progressive Democrats | 4.0 |
| | | Green Party | 3.9 |
| | | Sinn Féin | 6.5 |
| | | Socialist Party* | 0.8 |
| | 2011 | Fianna Fáil | 17.5 |
| | | Fine Gael | 36.1 |
| | | Labour Party | 19.5 |
| | | Green Party | 1.9 |
| | | Sinn Féin | 9.9 |
| | | Socialist Party | 1.2 |
| | | People Before Profit Alliance | 1.0 |
| | | United Left Alliance | Alliance |
| Netherlands | 1972 | Partij van de Arbeid | 27.3 |
| | | Katholieke Volkspartij | 17.7 |
| | | Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie | 14.5 |
| | | Anti-Revolutionaire Partij | 8.8 |
| | | Politieke Partij Radikalen | 4.8 |
| | | Christelijk-Historische Unie | 4.8 |
| | | Communistische Partij van Nederland | 4.5 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | Democraten 66 | 4.2 |
| | Democratisch Socialisten 70 | 4.1 |
| | Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij | 2.2 |
| | Boerenpartij | 1.9 |
| | Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond | 1.8 |
| | Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij | 1.5 |
| 1982 | Partij van de Arbeid | 30.4 |
| | Politieke Partij Radikalen | 1.7 |
| | Communistische Partij van Nederland | 1.8 |
| | Democraten 66 | 4.3 |
| | Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij | 1.9 |
| | Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond | 0.8 |
| | Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij | 2.3 |
| | Christen Democratisch Appèl | 29.4 |
| | Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie | 23.1 |
| | Reformatorische Politieke Federati | 1.5 |
| | Centrumpartij | 0.8 |
| 1994 | Partij van de Arbeid | 24.0 |
| | Democraten 66 | 15.5 |
| | Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij | 1.7 |
| | Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond | 1.3 |
| | Christen Democratisch Appèl | 22.2 |
| | Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie | 20.0 |
| | Reformatorische Politieke Federati | 1.8 |
| | Algemeen Ouderen Verbond | 3.6 |
| | GroenLinks | 3.5 |
| | Centrum Democraten | 2.5 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Socialistiese Partij | 1.3 |
| | 2003 | Partij van de Arbeid | 27.3 |
| | | Democraten 66 | 4.1 |
| | | Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij | 1.6 |
| | | ChristenUnie | 2.1 |
| | | Christen Democratisch Appèl | 28.6 |
| | | Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie | 17.9 |
| | | GroenLinks | 5.1 |
| | | Socialistiese Partij | 6.3 |
| | | Lijst Pim Fortuyn | 5.7 |
| | | Leefbaar Nederland* | Previous |
| | 2012 | Partij van de Arbeid | 24.8 |
| | | Democraten 66 | 8.0 |
| | | Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij | 2.1 |
| | | ChristenUnie | 3.1 |
| | | Christen Democratisch Appèl | 8.5 |
| | | Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie | 26.6 |
| | | GroenLinks | 2.3 |
| | | Socialistiese Partij | 9.7 |
| | | Partij voor de Vrijheid | 10.1 |
| | | Partij voor de Dieren | 1.9 |
| | | 50PLUS | 1.9 |
| Norway | 1973 | Det norske Arbeiderparti | 35.3 |
| | | Høyre | 17.4 |
| | | Senterpartiet | 11.0 |
| | | Kristelig Folkeparti | 12.2 |
| | | Anders Langes parti | 5.0 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | Venstre | 3.5 |
| | Det Nye Folkepartiet | 3.4 |
| | Sosialistisk Valgforbund | 11.2 |
| 1985 | Det norske Arbeiderparti | 40.8 |
| | Høyre | 30.4 |
| | Senterpartiet | 6.6 |
| | Kristelig Folkeparti | 8.3 |
| | Sosialistisk Venstreparti | 5.5 |
| | Fremskrittspartiet | 3.7 |
| | Venstre | 3.1 (Previous) |
| 1993 | Det norske Arbeiderparti | 36.9 |
| | Høyre | 17.0 |
| | Senterpartiet | 16.7 |
| | Kristelig Folkeparti | 7.9 |
| | Sosialistisk Venstreparti | 7.9 |
| | Fremskrittspartiet | 6.3 |
| | Venstre | 3.6 |
| | Rød Valgallianse | 1.1 |
| 2005 | Det norske Arbeiderparti | 32.7 |
| | Høyre | 14.1 |
| | Senterpartiet | 6.5 |
| | Kristelig Folkeparti | 6.8 |
| | Sosialistisk Venstreparti | 8.8 |
| | Fremskrittspartiet | 22.1 |
| | Venstre | 5.9 |
| | Kystpartiet | 0.8 (Previous) |
| 2013 | Det norske Arbeiderparti | 30.8 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Høyre | 25.8 |
| | | Senterpartiet | 5.5 |
| | | Kristelig Folkeparti | 5.6 |
| | | Sosialistisk Venstreparti | 4.1 |
| | | Fremskrittspartiet | 16.3 |
| | | Venstre | 5.2 |
| | | Miljøpartiet De Grønne | 2.8 |
| Sweden | 1973 | Socialdemokraterna | 43.6 |
| | | Centerpartiet | 25.1 |
| | | Moderaterna | 14.3 |
| | | Folkpartiet | 9.4 |
| | | Vänsterpartiet | 5.3 |
| | 1985 | Socialdemokraterna | 44.7 |
| | | Centerpartiet | 12.4 |
| | | Moderaterna | 21.3 |
| | | Folkpartiet | 14.2 |
| | | Vänsterpartiet | 5.4 |
| | 1994 | Socialdemokraterna | 45.3 |
| | | Centerpartiet | 7.7 |
| | | Moderaterna | 22.4 |
| | | Folkpartiet | 7.2 |
| | | Vänsterpartiet | 6.2 |
| | | Kristdemokraterna | 4.1 |
| | | Ny demokrati* | 1.2 (Previous) |
| | | Miljöpartiet | 5.0 |
| | 2002 | Socialdemokraterna | 39.9 |
| | | Centerpartiet | 6.2 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Moderaterna | 15.3 |
| | | Folkpartiet | 13.4 |
| | | Vänsterpartiet | 8.4 |
| | | Kristdemokraterna | 9.1 |
| | | Miljöpartiet | 4.6 |
| | 2014 | Socialdemokraterna | 31.0 |
| | | Centerpartiet | 6.1 |
| | | Moderaterna | 23.3 |
| | | Folkpartiet | 5.4 |
| | | Vänsterpartiet | 5.7 |
| | | Kristdemokraterna | 4.6 |
| | | Miljöpartiet | 6.9 |
| | | Sverigedemokraterna | 12.9 |
| United Kingdom | 1974 | Labour Party | 39.2 |
| | | Conservative and Unionist Party | 35.8 |
| | | Liberals | 18.3 |
| | 1983 | Labour Party | 27.6 |
| | | Conservative and Unionist Party | 42.4 |
| | | SDP- Liberal alliance | 25.4 |
| | 1992 | Labour Party | 34.9 |
| | | Conservative and Unionist Party | 41.9 |
| | | Liberal Democrats | 17.8 |
| | 2005 | Labour Party | 35.2 |
| | | Conservative and Unionist Party | 32.4 |
| | | Liberal Democrats | 22.0 |
| | | Respect -- The Unity Coalition | 0.3 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 2015 | Labour Party | 30.5 |
| | Conservative and Unionist Party | 36.9 |
| | Liberal Democrats | 7.9 |
| | Green party | 3.8 |

*Note*: *Previous* indicates that the party is included in the list because it was represented in the previous parliamentary term but did not win representation in the election we study. *Alliance* indicates that the party was part of an electoral alliance. If no election result is specified there is no separate result reported for that party. *Election manifesto is missing. The DIPAC data set does not include parties from Northern Ireland for United Kingdom or parties from Greenland and the Faroe Islands for Denmark.

# Appendix II – Coding schemes for Election manifestos

Saliency is coded for each sub-dimension in the following categories:

| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Not mentioned at all | Mentioned | Somewhat discussed, possible to identify position | Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided. |

For each sub-dimension with a saliency score of 2 or 3, the party's position in the manifesto as a whole is coded into the following categories:

| | 0 | 0,25 | 0,5 | 0,75 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Left-Right sub-dimensions | Left | Left, with elements of right | Both / Unclear | Right, with elements of left | Right |
| GAL-TAN sub-dimensions | GAL | GAL, with elements of TAN | Both / Unclear | TAN, with elements of GAL | TAN |
| Ideology-Competence | Focus on ideology | Ideology, with elements of competence | N.A | Competence, with elements of ideology | Focus on competence |

Coding scheme for the ideological positions

| | 0 | 0,25 | 0,5 | 0,75 | 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **State-Market** | State guides the economy to a large extent. State should own some/many commodities. Active intervention by state solution to economic problems. Exception: unions/employer association can be allowed, but should be regulated/protected to avoid bad effects of market on people. | State should be active in the economy, but there are also some areas where the free market makes necessary/ important contributions. | Either unclear position, or combination of pro-free market with role for the state | The free market is preeminent, but there are some cases where the state might need to play a role. Regulation of market important. State can act to improve conditions (infrastructure, education) for business, as long as not interfering with free market. | As little involvement of state as possible, state only regulates free market. No/low state ownership, privatizations good. Deregulation as solution to economic problem. Exception: regulation acceptable if intended to free market from subversion by e.g. unions |
| **Public-Private welfare provision** | The state should both finance and provide welfare. Some private complements can be tolerated, but not encouraged Equal access important | Some (positive) role for private actors possible, e.g. voluntary organisations, but welfare is the responsibility of the state. | Either unclear position, or combination of both, e.g. freedom to choose provider with state guarantee of access | State can regulate, fund or provide welfare to some degree, but private options are preferred and encouraged. | Welfare should be provided and to at least some degree funded by private actors. Freedom to choose important |
| **High- Low redistribution** | Large degree of redistribution. High taxes, especially for wealthy, and large social spending, especially targeting the poor. | High taxes and large social spending, but with less focus on redistribution, e.g. non-income related taxes or general welfare programmes | Unclear position, or combining elements from both sides, e.g. favouring both tax cuts for wealthy and increased social spending on poor | Low taxes and low social spending, but with less focus on diminished redistribution, e.g. tax cuts to low income earners. Social spending should be focused on those who most need it. | Low share of redistribution. Lower taxes, especially for wealthy, and cuts to social spending, especially targeting poor. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Environment – Economic growth** | The environment should be protected, (almost) no matter what the economic cost.<br>Economic growth and environmental protection difficult to achieve at the same time. | The environment should be protected, in a cost-efficient way.<br>Economic growth harms the environment, this should be rectified. | Unclear position, e.g. mentioning environment as important but not connecting with economy.<br>Arguing that environmental protection and economic growth go together | Environmental concerns can only be addressed when the cost is not too high. | Economic growth should (nearly always) be prioritized over environmental concerns. |
| **Civil liberties – Law & order** | Protection of civil liberties and individual rights paramount.<br>Focus on e.g. right to fair trial<br>If state must intervene prevention & care preferable to punishment. | Civil liberties are most important, but some reference to maintaining law and order is also made.<br>If state must intervene prevention & care preferable to punishment. | Unclear, or elements of both.<br>E.g. protection of some civil liberties combined with harsher sentences for some crimes | While the state/society has the right to protect itself, some efforts should be made to protect the individual's rights.<br>Prevention, not only punishment | Protection of law and order paramount.<br>Focus on punishment, little or no focus on prevention of crime. |
| **Individual liberty– Social authoritarianism** | The individuals right to live as (s)he wishes is paramount. State should not prohibit some lifestyles (e.g. freedom of religion) or promoting others (e.g. benefits targeting traditional families).<br>Exception: if explicit goal to promote individual freedom in society, e.g. regulation making it possible for individual to free themselves from social restrictions | The individual should be free to choose lifestyle, but some limitations might be necessary to ensure a functional society.<br>State can interfere to promote individual freedom or equal chances in society. | Unclear, or elements of both, e.g. social norms held to be most important in some areas but individual freedom in others | Individual lifestyle choices should be allowed, but not encouraged, and only if these do not pose threat to collective.<br>No special treatment | The collective (family, nation, class, survival of human race etc.) is more important than the individual.<br>State should promote traditional values and ways of life in order to protect social cohesion. |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Multiculturalism – National unity** | Several cultures/ways of life can co-exist & is beneficial.<br>Migration policies should be generous, and the rights of minority groups protected.<br>Migration & other cultural differences as opportunity, not threat.<br>State/majority group responsible for integration | While multiculturalism is good and should be encouraged, it's important not to lose all traditional identity.<br>Migration is in general positive, but some limitations/controls/ demands might be needed.<br>Minority group responsible for integration. | Unclear, or elements of both.<br>E.g. protection for national minorities but not migrants, or openness to migration only if beneficial to own country. | Minority cultures can be tolerated, but only if secondary to national identity. State should not support or encourage any other traditions than the national ones.<br>If migration is unavoidable it should be highly regulated | Different cultures can and should not be mixed.<br>Traditional way of life should be defended.<br>Migration policies should be strict, with repatriation or assimilation as the goal.<br>Migration & other cultural differences as threat, not opportunity. |
| **Cosmopolitanism –Nationalism** | Contributing to a better world paramount.<br>Co-operation with others is important, even if this entails loss of sovereignty.<br>Unilateral force should not be used in international relations, no military alliances.<br>Globalisation as opportunity, not threat.<br>Any problems associated with globalisation should be solved by international co-operation | International co-operation is important and should be peaceful – but alliances for security, peace keeping missions etc. acceptable.<br>Loss of sovereignty only acceptable if clearly outweighed by benefits. | Unclear, or elements of both. | International co-operation can be beneficial, but important that own country gains (financial, security, power etc.) from it.<br>Loss of sovereignty not acceptable.<br>Strong defence important | Protection of own country paramount.<br>Co-operation with others is risky and only acceptable if clearly advantageous.<br>Loss of sovereignty never acceptable.<br>Strong military important.<br>Globalisation as threat.<br>Solution to problems of globalisation is isolation/ protectionism |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Pro-EU – Anti-EU** | EU good thing, integration should be pushed further. Problems with EU should be solved by further co-operation/integration. More EU-members good thing | EU good thing, but further integration should be done carefully. Principle of subsidiarity important. Positive to current EU, but no mention of more or less integration. | EU not perfect/has problems or is "bad idea", but should not leave. EU good idea, but should not join. | EU bad thing, less integration or substantial reform desirable. Either reform or leave. | EU bad thing, European integration not desirable. Leave/not join |

# Appendix III – Variables

| Code | Variable | |
|---|---|---|
| **General information** | | |
| ID | 1-12, 14-109 | |
| Party_id | 28 | Venstresocialisterne (VS), Enhedslisten – De Rød-Grønne (Ø) |
| | 29 | Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti (DKP) |
| | 30 | Socialistisk Folkeparti (F) |
| | 31 | Socialdemokraterne (A) |
| | 32 | Centrumdemokraterna (M) |
| | 33 | Det Radikale Venstre (B) |
| | 34 | Retsforbundet (E) |
| | 35 | Det Konservative Folkeparti (C) |
| | 36 | Kristeligt folkeparti, Kristendemokraterne (K) |
| | 37 | Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti (B) |
| | 38 | Fremskridtspartiet (Z) |
| | 39 | De Grønne (MDG) |
| | 41 | Dansk Folkeparti (O) |
| | 42 | Ny/Liberal Alliance |
| | 43 | Nye Borgerlige (D) |
| | 44 | Alternativet (Å) |
| | 45 | Extre-gauche (PSU) |
| | 46 | Parti Communiste Français (PCF) |
| | 47 | La France Insoumise |
| | 48 | Parti Socialiste (PS) |
| | 49 | Mouvement des Radiaux de Gauche (MRG) |
| | 50 | Centre démocratie et progrés, Centre des Democrates Sociaux (SDS) |
| | 51 | Nouveau Centre (C), Les Centristes (LC), Union of Democrats and Independents (UDI |
| | 52 | Parti Radical |
| | 53 | Ecologists (Movement Ecologique) 1999- Les Vertes, Europe Écologie Les Verts (ELVV) |
| | 54 | Autres Ecologists |
| | 55 | Rassemblement pour la Republique (RPR), Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP), Les Republicains (LR) |
| | 56 | Parti Republicain |
| | 57 | Agir, la droite constructive (ACT) |
| | 58 | Mouvement Réformateur |
| | 59 | Union pour la Democratie Francaise (UDF), Mouvement Démocrate (MoDem) |
| | 60 | Centre National des Indépendants et Paysans |
| | 61 | Front National (2005: FN+sorted extreme right) |
| | 62 | Démocratie Libérale |
| | 63 | Chasse, pêche, nature et traditions (CPNT) |
| | 64 | Mouvement pour la France (MPF) |
| | 65 | Alliance Centriste |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | 66 | Debout la République (DLR), Debout la France (DLF) |
| | 67 | La République En Marche! (LaREM) |
| | 68 | Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutchlands (SPD) |
| | 69 | Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) |
| | 70 | Die Grünen/Buendnis 90 |
| | 71 | Christlich-Demokratische Union/Christlich-Soziale Union (CDU/CSU) |
| | 72 | Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS), Die Linke |
| | 73 | Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) |
| | 74 | Labour Party |
| | 75 | Fine Gael (Irish Family) |
| | 76 | Fianna Fail (Soldiers of Destiny) |
| | 77 | Sinn Fein (Ourselves alone) |
| | 78 | Progressive Democrats |
| | 79 | Green Party |
| | 80 | Workers Party |
| | 81 | Socialist Party |
| | 82 | Democratic left |
| | 83 | People Before Profit Alliance |
| | 90 | Communistische Partij Nederland (CPN) |
| | 91 | Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij (PSP) |
| | 92 | Politieke Partij Radikalen (PPR) |
| | 93 | Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA) |
| | 94 | Democraten ‘66 (D'66) |
| | 95 | Democratisch Socialisten '70 (DS'70) |
| | 96 | Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA) |
| | 97 | Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD) |
| | 98 | Boerenpartij (BP) |
| | 99 | Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (SGP) |
| | 100 | Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond (GPV), ChristenUnie (CU) (GPV+RPF after 2000) |
| | 101 | List Pim Fortuyn |
| | 102 | Reformatorische Politieke Federatie (RPF) |
| | 103 | Katholieke Volkspartij |
| | 104 | GroenLinks |
| | 105 | Socialistische Partij |
| | 106 | Christelijk-Historische Unie |
| | 107 | Centrumdemocraten |
| | 108 | De Groenen |
| | 109 | Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) |
| | 110 | Partij voor de Dieren (PvdD) |
| | 111 | Anti-Revolutionaire Partij |
| | 112 | 50Plus |
| | 113 | Algemeen Ouderen Verbond |
| | 114 | Forum voor Democratie (FvD) |
| | 115 | Det norske Arbeiderparti (DNA), Arbeiderpartiet (Ap) |
| | 116 | Det Nye/Liberale Folkepartiet (DNF/DLF) |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | 117 | Höyre (H) |
| | 118 | Kristeligt Folkeparti (KrF) |
| | 119 | Pensjonistpartiet |
| | 120 | Rød Valgallianse (RV), Rødt |
| | 121 | Senterpartiet (SP) |
| | 122 | Socialstisk Valgforbund/ Socialistik Venstre (SV) |
| | 123 | Venstre |
| | 124 | Anders Langes Parti/Framskrittspartiet (FrP) |
| | 125 | Miljøpartiet De Grønne (MDG) |
| | 126 | Kystpartiet |
| | 127 | Vänsterpartiet kommunisterna (VPK), Vänsterpartiet (V) |
| | 128 | Socialdemokratiska arbetarepartiet, Socialdemokraterna (S) |
| | 129 | Centerpartiet (C) |
| | 130 | Folkpartiet, Folkpartiet liberalerna (FP), Liberalerna (L) |
| | 131 | Moderata samlingspartiet, Moderaterna (M) |
| | 132 | Kristen demokratisk samling, Kristdemokratiska samhällspartiet (KDS), Kristdemokraterna (KD) |
| | 133 | Miljöpartiet, Miljöpartiet de gröna (MP) |
| | 134 | Ny demokrati (NYD) |
| | 135 | Sverigedemokraterna (SD) |
| | 136 | Labour Party |
| | 137 | Liberal Party, Social Democratic Party, LP/SDP Alliance, Liberal Democrats (LD) |
| | 138 | SNP (also if "Nationalists" (Scottish, Welsh)) |
| | 139 | Conservative Party |
| | 140 | Green Party |
| | 141 | Plaid Cumry |
| | 142 | UK Independence Party (UKIP) |
| Party_name | Party Name | |
| Countryname | Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom | |
| Country_id | 1 Denmark, 2 France, 3 Germany, 4 Ireland, 5 Netherlands, 6 Norway, 7 Sweden, 8 United Kingdom | |
| Year.1970 | Election year coded in the mid-1970s (year of election): 1972-1975 | |
| Year.1980 | Election year coded in the mid-1980s (year of election): 1981-1985 | |
| Year.1990 | Election year coded in the mid-1990s (year of election): 1992-1994 | |
| Year.2000 | Election year coded in the mid-2000s (year of election): 2002-2005 | |
| Year.2010 | Election year coded in the mid-2010s (year of election): 2011-2015 | |
| End_term.1970 | End of electoral term, year: 1976-1979 | |
| End_term.1980 | End of electoral term, year: 1986-1989 | |
| End_term.1990 | End of electoral term, year: 1997-1998 | |
| End_term.2000 | End of electoral term, year: 2006-2010 | |
| End_term.2010 | End of electoral term, year: 2016-2019 | |
| **Ideological variables** | | |
| SM_s.1970 | State-Market saliency in the mid-1970s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) | |

| | |
|---|---|
| SM_s.1980 | State-Market saliency in the mid-1980s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| SM_s.1990 | State-Market saliency in the mid-1990s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| SM_s.2000 | State-Market saliency in the mid-2000s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| SM_s.2010 | State-Market saliency in the mid-2010s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| SM_p.1970 | State-Market position in the mid-1970s: state (0), market (1) |
| SM_p.1980 | State-Market position in the mid-1980s: state (0), market (1) |
| SM_p.1990 | State-Market position in the mid-1990s: state (0), market (1) |
| SM_p.2000 | State-Market position in the mid-2000s: state (0), market (1) |
| SM_p.2010 | State-Market position in the mid-2010s: state (0), market (1) |
| SM_b.1970 | State-Market blurriness in the mid-1970s: low (0), high (1) |
| SM_b.1980 | State-Market blurriness in the mid-1980s: low (0), high (1) |
| SM_b.1990 | State-Market blurriness in the mid-1990s: low (0), high (1) |
| SM_b.2000 | State-Market blurriness in the mid-2000s: low (0), high (1) |
| SM_b.2010 | State-Market blurriness in the mid-2010s: low (0), high (1) |
| PP_s.1970 | Public-Private welfare provision saliency in the mid-1970s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| PP_s.1980 | Public-Private welfare provision saliency in the mid-1980s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| PP_s.1990 | Public-Private welfare provision saliency in the mid-1990s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| PP_s.2000 | Public-Private welfare provision saliency in the mid-2000s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| PP_s.2010 | Public-Private welfare provision saliency in the mid-2010s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| PP_p.1970 | Public-Private welfare provision position in the mid-1970s: public (0), private (1) |
| PP_p.1980 | Public-Private welfare provision position in the mid-1980s: public (0), private (1) |
| PP_p.1990 | Public-Private welfare provision position in the mid-1990s: public (0), private (1) |
| PP_p.2000 | Public-Private welfare provision position in the mid-2000s: public (0), private (1) |
| PP_p.2010 | Public-Private welfare provision position in the mid-2010s: public (0), private (1) |

| | |
|---|---|
| PP_b.1970 | Public-Private welfare provision blurriness in the mid-1970s: low (0), high (1) |
| PP_b.1980 | Public-Private welfare provision blurriness in the mid-1980s: low (0), high (1) |
| PP_b.1990 | Public-Private welfare provision blurriness in the mid-1990s: low (0), high (1) |
| PP_b.2000 | Public-Private welfare provision blurriness in the mid-2000s: low (0), high (1) |
| PP_b.2010 | Public-Private welfare provision blurriness in the mid-2010s: low (0), high (1) |
| RE_s.1970 | High-Low redistribution saliency in the mid-1970s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| RE_s.1980 | High-Low redistribution saliency in the mid-1980s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| RE_s.1990 | High-Low redistribution saliency in the mid-1990s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| RE_s.2000 | High-Low redistribution saliency in the mid-2000s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| RE_s.2010 | High-Low redistribution saliency in the mid-2010s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| RE_p.1970 | High-Low redistribution position in the mid-1970s: high (1), low (1) |
| RE_p.1980 | High-Low redistribution position in the mid-1980s: high (1), low (1) |
| RE_p.1990 | High-Low redistribution position in the mid-1990s: high (1), low (1) |
| RE_p.2000 | High-Low redistribution position in the mid-2000s: high (1), low (1) |
| RE_p.2010 | High-Low redistribution position in the mid-2010s: high (1), low (1) |
| RE_b.1970 | High-Low redistribution blurriness in the mid-1970s: low (0), high (1) |
| RE_b.1980 | High-Low redistribution blurriness in the mid-1980s: low (0), high (1) |
| RE_b.1990 | High-Low redistribution blurriness in the mid-1990s: low (0), high (1) |
| RE_b.2000 | High-Low redistribution blurriness in the mid-2000s: low (0), high (1) |
| RE_b.2010 | High-Low redistribution blurriness in the mid-2010s: low (0), high (1) |
| LR_s.1970 | Average Left-Right saliency in the mid-1970s (SM_s.1970+PP_s.1970+RE_s.1970 /3): low saliency (0), high saliency (3) |
| LR_s.1980 | Average Left-Right saliency in the mid-1980s (SM_s.1980+PP_s.1980+RE_s.1980 /3): low saliency (0), high saliency (3) |
| LR_s.1990 | Average Left-Right saliency in the mid-1990s (SM_s.1990+PP_s.1990+RE_s.1990 /3): low saliency (0), high saliency (3) |
| LR_s.2000 | Average Left-Right saliency in the mid-2000s (SM_s.2000+PP_s.2000+RE_s.2000 /3): low saliency (0), high saliency (3) |

| | |
|---|---|
| LR_s.2010 | Average Left-Right saliency in the mid-2010s (SM_s.2010+PP_s.2010+RE_s.2010 /3): low saliency (0), high saliency (3) |
| LR_p.1970 | Average Left-Right position in the mid-1970s (SM_p.1970+PP_p.1970+RE_9.1970 /3): left (0), right (1) |
| LR_p.1980 | Average Left-Right position in the mid-1980s (SM_p.1980+PP_p.1980+RE_9.1980 /3): left (0), right (1) |
| LR_p.1990 | Average Left-Right position in the mid-1990s (SM_p.1990+PP_p.1990+RE_9.1990 /3): left (0), right (1) |
| LR_p.2000 | Average Left-Right position in the mid-2000s (SM_p.2000+PP_p.2000+RE_9.2000 /3): left (0), right (1) |
| LR_p.2010 | Average Left-Right position in the mid-2010s (SM_p.2010+PP_p.2010+RE_9.2010 /3): left (0), right (1) |
| LR_b.1970 | Average Left-Right blurriness in the mid-1970s (SM_b.1970+PP_b.1970+RE_b.1970 /3): low (0), high (1) |
| LR_b.1980 | Average Left-Right blurriness in the mid-1980s (SM_b.1980+PP_b.1980+RE_b.1980 /3): low (0), high (1) |
| LR_b.1990 | Average Left-Right blurriness in the mid-1990s (SM_b.1990+PP_b.1990+RE_b.1990 /3): low (0), high (1) |
| LR_b.2000 | Average Left-Right blurriness in the mid-2000s (SM_b.2000+PP_b.2000+RE_b.2000 /3): low (0), high (1) |
| LR_b.2010 | Average Left-Right blurriness in the mid-2010s (SM_b.2010+PP_b.2010+RE_b.2010 /3): low (0), high (1) |
| CL_s.1970 | Civil liberties –Law and order saliency in the mid-1970s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| CL_s.1980 | Civil liberties –Law and order saliency in the mid-1980s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| CL_s.1990 | Civil liberties –Law and order saliency in the mid-1990s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| CL_s.2000 | Civil liberties –Law and order saliency in the mid-2000s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| CL_s.2010 | Civil liberties –Law and order saliency in the mid-2010s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| CL_p.1970 | Civil liberties –Law and order position in the mid-1970s: Civil liberties (0), Law and order (1) |
| CL_p.1980 | Civil liberties –Law and order position in the mid-1980s: Civil liberties (0), Law and order (1) |
| CL_p.1990 | Civil liberties –Law and order position in the mid-1990s: Civil liberties (0), Law and order (1) |
| CL_p.2000 | Civil liberties –Law and order position in the mid-2000s: Civil liberties (0), Law and order (1) |
| CL_p.2010 | Civil liberties –Law and order position in the mid-2010s: Civil liberties (0), Law and order (1) |

| | |
|---|---|
| CL_b.1970 | Civil liberties –Law and order blurriness in the mid-1970s: low (0), high (1) |
| CL_b.1980 | Civil liberties –Law and order blurriness in the mid-1980s: low (0), high (1) |
| CL_b.1990 | Civil liberties –Law and order blurriness in the mid-1990s: low (0), high (1) |
| CL_b.2000 | Civil liberties –Law and order blurriness in the mid-2000s: low (0), high (1) |
| CL_b.2010 | Civil liberties –Law and order blurriness in the mid-2010s: low (0), high (1) |
| CN_s.1970 | Cosmopolitanism – Nationalism saliency in the mid-1970s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| CN_s.1980 | Cosmopolitanism – Nationalism saliency in the mid-1980s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| CN_s.1990 | Cosmopolitanism – Nationalism saliency in the mid-1990s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| CN_s.2000 | Cosmopolitanism – Nationalism saliency in the mid-2000s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| CN_s.2010 | Cosmopolitanism – Nationalism saliency in the mid-2010s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| CN_p.1970 | Cosmopolitanism – Nationalism position in the mid-1970s: cosmopolitanism (0), nationalism (1) |
| CN_p.1980 | Cosmopolitanism – Nationalism position in the mid-1980s: cosmopolitanism (0), nationalism (1) |
| CN_p.1990 | Cosmopolitanism – Nationalism position in the mid-1990s: cosmopolitanism (0), nationalism (1) |
| CN_p.2000 | Cosmopolitanism – Nationalism position in the mid-2000s: cosmopolitanism (0), nationalism (1) |
| CN_p.2010 | Cosmopolitanism – Nationalism position in the mid-2010s: cosmopolitanism (0), nationalism (1) |
| CN_b.1970 | Cosmopolitanism – Nationalism blurriness in the mid-1970s: low (0), high (1) |
| CN_b.1980 | Cosmopolitanism – Nationalism blurriness in the mid-1980s: low (0), high (1) |
| CN_b.1990 | Cosmopolitanism – Nationalism blurriness in the mid-1990s: low (0), high (1) |
| CN_b.2000 | Cosmopolitanism – Nationalism blurriness in the mid-2000s: low (0), high (1) |
| CN_b.2010 | Cosmopolitanism – Nationalism blurriness in the mid-2010s: low (0), high (1) |
| EE_s.1970 | Environment – Economic growth saliency in the mid-1970s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |

| | |
|---|---|
| EE_s.1980 | Environment – Economic growth saliency in the mid-1980s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| EE_s.1990 | Environment – Economic growth saliency in the mid-1990s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| EE_s.2000 | Environment – Economic growth saliency in the mid-2000s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| EE_s.2010 | Environment – Economic growth saliency in the mid-2010s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| EE_p.1970 | Environment – Economic growth position in the mid-1970s: environment (0), economic growth (1) |
| EE_p.1980 | Environment – Economic growth position in the mid-1980s: environment (0), economic growth (1) |
| EE_p.1990 | Environment – Economic growth position in the mid-1990s: environment (0), economic growth (1) |
| EE_p.2000 | Environment – Economic growth position in the mid-2000s: environment (0), economic growth (1) |
| EE_p.2010 | Environment – Economic growth position in the mid-2010s: environment (0), economic growth (1) |
| EE_b.1970 | Environment – Economic growth blurriness in the mid-1970s: low (0), high (1) |
| EE_b.1980 | Environment – Economic growth blurriness in the mid-1980s: low (0), high (1) |
| EE_b.1990 | Environment – Economic growth blurriness in the mid-1990s: low (0), high (1) |
| EE_b.2000 | Environment – Economic growth blurriness in the mid-2000s: low (0), high (1) |
| EE_b.2010 | Environment – Economic growth blurriness in the mid-2010s: low (0), high (1) |
| IS_s.1970 | Individual liberty – Social authoritarianism saliency in the mid-1970s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| IS_s.1980 | Individual liberty – Social authoritarianism saliency in the mid-1980s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| IS_s.1990 | Individual liberty – Social authoritarianism saliency in the mid-1990s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| IS_s.2000 | Individual liberty – Social authoritarianism saliency in the mid-2000s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| IS_s.2010 | Individual liberty – Social authoritarianism saliency in the mid-2010s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |

| | |
|---|---|
| IS_p.1970 | Individual liberty – Social authoritarianism position in the mid-1970s: individual liberty (0), Social authoritarianism (1) |
| IS_p.1980 | Individual liberty – Social authoritarianism position in the mid-1980s: individual liberty (0), Social authoritarianism (1) |
| IS_p.1990 | Individual liberty – Social authoritarianism position in the mid-1990s: individual liberty (0), Social authoritarianism (1) |
| IS_p.2000 | Individual liberty – Social authoritarianism position in the mid-2000s: individual liberty (0), Social authoritarianism (1) |
| IS_p.2010 | Individual liberty – Social authoritarianism position in the mid-2010s: individual liberty (0), Social authoritarianism (1) |
| IS_b.1970 | Individual liberty – Social authoritarianism blurriness in the mid-1970s: low (0), high (1) |
| IS_b.1980 | Individual liberty – Social authoritarianism blurriness in the mid-1980s: low (0), high (1) |
| IS_b.1990 | Individual liberty – Social authoritarianism blurriness in the mid-1990s: low (0), high (1) |
| IS_b.2000 | Individual liberty – Social authoritarianism blurriness in the mid-2000s: low (0), high (1) |
| IS_b.2010 | Individual liberty – Social authoritarianism blurriness in the mid-2010s: low (0), high (1) |
| MN_s.1970 | Multiculturalism – National unity saliency in the mid-1970s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| MN_s.1980 | Multiculturalism – National unity saliency in the mid-1980s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| MN_s.1990 | Multiculturalism – National unity saliency in the mid-1990s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| MN_s.2000 | Multiculturalism – National unity saliency in the mid-2000s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| MN_s.2010 | Multiculturalism – National unity saliency in the mid-2010s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| MN_p.1970 | Multiculturalism – National unity position in the mid-1970s: multiculturalism (0), National unity (1) |
| MN_p.1980 | Multiculturalism – National unity position in the mid-1980s: multiculturalism (0), National unity (1) |
| MN_p.1990 | Multiculturalism – National unity position in the mid-1990s: multiculturalism (0), National unity (1) |
| MN_p.2000 | Multiculturalism – National unity position in the mid-2000s: multiculturalism (0), National unity (1) |
| MN_p.2010 | Multiculturalism – National unity position in the mid-2010s: multiculturalism (0), National unity (1) |
| MN_b.1970 | Multiculturalism – National unity blurriness in the mid-1970s: low (0), high (1) |

| | |
|---|---|
| MN_b.1980 | Multiculturalism – National unity blurriness in the mid-1980s: low (0), high (1) |
| MN_b.1990 | Multiculturalism – National unity blurriness in the mid-1990s: low (0), high (1) |
| MN_b.2000 | Multiculturalism – National unity blurriness in the mid-2000s: low (0), high (1) |
| MN_b.2010 | Multiculturalism – National unity blurriness in the mid-2010s: low (0), high (1) |
| EU_s.1970 | Pro-Anti EU saliency in the mid-1970s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| EU_s.1980 | Pro-Anti EU saliency in the mid-1980s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| EU_s.1990 | Pro-Anti EU saliency in the mid-1990s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| EU_s.2000 | Pro-Anti EU saliency in the mid-2000s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| EU_s.2010 | Pro-Anti EU saliency in the mid-2010s: Not mentioned at all (0), Mentioned (1), Somewhat discussed (2), Central dimension with clear ideological arguments provided (3) |
| EU_p.1970 | Pro-Anti EU position in the mid-1970s: pro-EU (0), anti-EU (1) |
| EU_p.1980 | Pro-Anti EU position in the mid-1980s: pro-EU (0), anti-EU (1) |
| EU_p.1990 | Pro-Anti EU position in the mid-1990s: pro-EU (0), anti-EU (1) |
| EU_p.2000 | Pro-Anti EU position in the mid-2000s: pro-EU (0), anti-EU (1) |
| EU_p.2010 | Pro-Anti EU position in the mid-2010s: pro-EU (0), anti-EU (1) |
| EU_b.1970 | Pro-Anti EU blurriness in the mid-1970s: low (0), high (1) |
| EU_b.1980 | Pro-Anti EU blurriness in the mid-1980s: low (0), high (1) |
| EU_b.1990 | Pro-Anti EU blurriness in the mid-1990s: low (0), high (1) |
| EU_b.2000 | Pro-Anti EU blurriness in the mid-2000s: low (0), high (1) |
| EU_b.2010 | Pro-Anti EU blurriness in the mid-2010s: low (0), high (1) |
| GT_s.1970 | Average GAL-TAN saliency in the mid-1970s (CL_s.1970+CN_s.1970+EE_s.1970+IS_s.1970+MN_s.1970+EU_s.1970/6): Low saliency (0), High saliency (3) |
| GT_s.1980 | Average GAL-TAN saliency in the mid-1980s (CL_s.1980+CN_s.1980+EE_s.1980+IS_s.1980+MN_s.1980+EU_s.1980/6): Low saliency (0), High saliency (3) |
| GT_s.1990 | Average GAL-TAN saliency in the mid-1990s (CL_s.1990+CN_s.1990+EE_s.1990+IS_s.1990+MN_s.1990+EU_s.1990/6): Low saliency (0), High saliency (3) |
| GT_s.2000 | Average GAL-TAN saliency in the mid-2000s (CL_s.2000+CN_s.2000+EE_s.2000+IS_s.2000+MN_s.2000+EU_s.2000/6): Low saliency (0), High saliency (3) |
| GT_s.2010 | Average GAL-TAN saliency in the mid-2010s (CL_s.2010+CN_s.2010+EE_s.2010+IS_s.2010+MN_s.2010+EU_s.2010/6): Low saliency (0), High saliency (3) |

| | |
|---|---|
| GT_p.1970 | Average GAL-TAN position in the mid-1970s (CL_p.1970+CN_p.1970+EE_p.1970+IS_p.1970+MN_p.1970+EU_p.1970/6): GAL (0), TAN (1) |
| GT_p.1980 | Average GAL-TAN position in the mid-1980s (CL_p.1980+CN_p.1980+EE_p.1980+IS_p.1980+MN_p.1980+EU_p.1980/6): GAL (0), TAN (1) |
| GT_p.1990 | Average GAL-TAN position in the mid-1990s (CL_p.1990+CN_p.1990+EE_p.1990+IS_p.1990+MN_p.1990+EU_p.1990/6): GAL (0), TAN (1) |
| GT_p.2000 | Average GAL-TAN position in the mid-2000s (CL_p.2000+CN_p.2000+EE_p.2000+IS_p.2000+MN_p.2000+EU_p.2000/6): GAL (0), TAN (1) |
| GT_p.2010 | Average GAL-TAN position in the mid-2010s (CL_p.2010+CN_p.2010+EE_p.2010+IS_p.2010+MN_p.2010+EU_p.2010/6): GAL (0), TAN (1) |
| GT_b.1970 | Average GAL-TAN blurriness in the mid-1970s (CL_b.1970+CN_b.1970+EE_b.1970+IS_b.1970+MN_b.1970+EU_b.1970/6): low (0), high (1) |
| GT_b.1980 | Average GAL-TAN blurriness in the mid-1980s (CL_b.1980+CN_b.1980+EE_b.1980+IS_b.1980+MN_b.1980+EU_b.1980/6): low (0), high (1) |
| GT_b.1990 | Average GAL-TAN blurriness in the mid-1990s (CL_b.1990+CN_b.1990+EE_b.1990+IS_b.1990+MN_b.1990+EU_b.1990/6): low (0), high (1) |
| GT_b.2000 | Average GAL-TAN blurriness in the mid-2000s (CL_b.2000+CN_b.2000+EE_b.2000+IS_b.2000+MN_b.2000+EU_b.2000/6): low (0), high (1) |
| GT_b.2010 | Average GAL-TAN blurriness in the mid-2010s (CL_b.2010+CN_b.2010+EE_b.2010+IS_b.2010+MN_b.2010+EU_b.2010/6): low (0), high (1) |
| IC.1970 | Ideology – Competence in the mid-1970s: Mainly ideology (0), ideology with some competence (0.75), competence with some ideology (0.25), Mainly competence (1) |
| IC.1980 | Ideology – Competence in the mid-1980s: Mainly ideology (0), ideology with some competence (0.75), competence with some ideology (0.25), Mainly competence (1) |
| IC.1990 | Ideology – Competence in the mid-1990s: Mainly ideology (0), ideology with some competence (0.75), competence with some ideology (0.25), Mainly competence (1) |
| IC.2000 | Ideology – Competence in the mid-2000s: Mainly ideology (0), ideology with some competence (0.75), competence with some ideology (0.25), Mainly competence (1) |
| IC.2010 | Ideology – Competence in the mid-2010s: Mainly ideology (0), ideology with some competence (0.75), competence with some ideology (0.25), Mainly competence (1) |
| Enemy.1970 | Main Enemy in the mid-1970s: text |
| Enemy.1980 | Main Enemy in the mid-1980s: text |
| Enemy.1990 | Main Enemy in the mid-1990s: text |

| | |
|---|---|
| Enemy.2000 | Main Enemy in the mid-2000s: text |
| Enemy.2010 | Main Enemy in the mid-2010s: text |
| Problem.1970 | Main Problem in the mid-1970s: text |
| Problem.1980 | Main Problem in the mid-1980s: text |
| Problem.1990 | Main Problem in the mid-1990s: text |
| Problem.2000 | Main Problem in the mid-2000s: text |
| Problem.2010 | Main Problem in the mid-2010s: text |